Brady has shown how to define a class of deep relevant logics from Meyer's Crystal lattice CL. The aim of this paper is to generalize Brady's result by showing how to define a class of deep relevant logics from each weak relevant matrix (weak relevant matrices only verify logics with the variable-sharing property). A class of deep relevant logics not included in R-Mingle is defined.
Brady's aim is to set the drc as a necessary syntactical condition for some paraconsistent logics lacking the contraction axiom, used in deriving Curry's Paradox. And the logic DR "is chosen as an intuitive subsystem of DT [...] obtained by removing the less intuitive axioms from DT" ( [5] , p. 64), to wit:
Remark 2 DR is originally defined by introducing disjunction ∨ via the definition  ∨  = df ¬(¬ ∧ ¬).
Brady's strategy essentially consists in relativizing valuations in Meyer's
Crystal lattice CL to levels of depth by determining the value of outer levels in implicative formulas by valuations at inner levels. Implicative formulas are defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Implicative formulas)
A wff  is implicative iff  is of the form  →  where  and  are wff.
Meyer's CL is a simplification of Belnap's M 0 used by the latter to prove for the first time that the Logic of Entailment E has the vsp (cf. [8] , pp. 95, ss; [3] and [2] , §22.1.3. M 0 and CL are displayed below in Example 4.4 and Example 4.5, respectively) .
The aim of this paper is to generalize Brady's strategy by using weak relevant matrices (wr-matrices). The notion of a wr-matrix is introduced in [13] . These matrices have the property that logics verified by them (cf. §2 below) have the vsp. Following Brady, it will be shown how to relativize valuations in wrmatrices in order to restrict the class of logics with the vsp verified by each particular wr-matrix to a subclass of logics with the drc.
In [13] it is proved that logics well far off the spectrum of standard relevant logics have the vsp and related properties shown predicable of E and R by Anderson and Belnap (cf. [2] , §22. 1.3) . In a similar way, it is proved in the present paper that there are logics with the drc that neither include nor are included in DR but that, nevertheless, do not have the contraction axiom as a theorem. In fact, a logic with the drc not included in R-Mingle (RM) shall be defined. As it is known, R-Mingle is the result of adding the axiom "mingle" ( → ( → )) to R, and it lacks the vsp. Although interesting of their own, these logics with the drc not included in RM are mostly introduced as a way of an example, because it follows from Brady's method that each wr-matrix generates a class of logics with the drc.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In §2, we set a series of preliminary definitions including those of logical matrix, degree of formulas, depth of a subformula within a formula and the depth relevance condition. Section 3 is a brief discussion on the relations between the drc and the Ackermann and Converse Ackermann properties. In §4, weak relevant matrices (wr-matrices) are defined, and it is proved that if a logic S is verified by a wr-matrix, then S has the vsp. In §5, wr-model structures are defined. Wr-model structures are built upon wr-matrices, and it is proved that any logic verified by a wr-model structure has the drc. In §6, it is displayed a wr-matrix verifying a class of logics not included in RM. In §7, a wr-model structure is built upon the wr-matrix defined in §6. Then, it is shown that this model structure verifies a class of deep relevant logics not included in RM3, a strong extension of RM (see [4] on RM3). Finally, in §8, we end the paper with some conclusions on the results obtained as well as with some comments on further work related to the present topic.
As pointed out above, our results are based on those by Brady in [5] . And we have maintained, as much as possible, Brady's notation and terminology, especially when defining wr-model structures.
Logical matrices. Preliminary definitions
We shall consider logics formulated in the Hilbert style form defined on propositional languages with a set of denumerable propositional variables and some (or all) of the connectives: → (relevant conditional), Ã (deep relevant conditional), ∧ (conjunction), ∨ (disjunction), ¬ (negation), the biconditional ↔ and ! being defined in the customary way.
The set of wff is also defined in the usual way; , , , etc are metalinguistic variable.
The notion of a logical matrix is defined as follows:
where:
1.  is a set.
2.  and  are non-empty subsets of  such that  ∪  =  and  ∩  = ∅.
3.  → ,  ∧ ,  ∨ are binary functions (distinct of each other) on , and  ¬ is a unary function on .
It is said that  is the set of elements of M;  is the set of designated elements, and  is the set of non-designated elements. The functions  → ,  ∧ ,  ∨ and  ¬ interpret in M the conditional, conjunction, disjunction and negation, respectively. In some cases one or more of these functions may not be defined. Now, let L be a propositional language,  1     ,  be any wff of L and S be a logic defined on L. On the other hand, let M be a logical matrix and   an assignment of elements of M to the propositional variables of . That  is assigned the element  of  is expressed as follows:
Then, we set:
Definition 5 Let M be a logical matrix. M verifies  iff for any assignment,   , of elements of  to the propositional variables of ,   () ∈  . M falsifies  iff M does not verify .
Definition 6 Let  1     ⇒  be a rule of derivation, and M be a logical matrix. Then, M verifies  1     ⇒  iff for any assignment,   , of elements of  to the variables of
Finally, Definition 7 Let M be a logical matrix. M verifies S iff M verifies all axioms and rules of derivation of S.
Remark 8 Formulas of the form  Ã  are not interpreted by logical matrices but by model structures defined on wr-matrices (see §5, below).
Next, we shall proceed to define the depth relevance condition. In order to do this, we need (cf. [8] , §11.1) the notions of "degree of a formula " (in symbols, ()) and "depth of a formula  in another formula " (in symbols, [ ]). Let  be a wff. Then, () is defined inductively as follows:
Definition 9 (Degree of formulas) So, the degree of a formula  is the maximum number of nested '→"s ('Ã"s) in .
Let now  be a wff and  be a subformula of . Then, [ ] is defined inductively on occurrences of  in  as follows.
Definition 10 (Depth of a subformula within a formula)
So, the depth of a particular occurrence of  in  is the number of nested '→"s ('Ã"s) between this particular occurrence of  and the whole formula . Notice that () = {{[ ] |  is a propositional variable occurring in }. That is to say, the degree of  is equivalent to the depth of the propositional variable with the highest depth in  Now, the depth relevance condition is defined as follows:
Definition 11 (Depth relevance condition -drc) Let S be a propositional logic with the following connectives: →, ∧, ∨ and ¬. S has the deep relevant condition (or S is deep relevant) if in all theorems of S of the form  →  there is at least one propositional variable  such that
Remark 12 If a logic S has the drc, we can write  Ã  instead of  →  for each theorem  →  of S.
Example 13 Consider the wff :
Remark 14 Let S be a propositional logic. If any of the following is a theorem of S, then S does not have the drc.
So, notice that relevant logics such as Ticket Entailment, T, Entailment, E, or Relevance, R, do not have the drc.
Remark 15
Consider the contraction rule
share the underlined  at the same level, t16 cannot be a rule of any logic including B + if the drc is to be preserved because in B + plus t16 the thesis t8 is derivable (B + is Routley and Meyer's basic positive logic. See [11] or [14] ).
3 Excursus: The depth relevance condition and the Ackermann Property
The Ackermann Property reads as follows:
Definition 16 (Ackermann Property) A logic S has the Ackermann Prop-
The label "Ackermann Property" is Anderson and Belnap's. The AP is named after a theorem proved by Ackermann stating that his systems Π and Π 0 have the property (cf. [1] , §6).
On the other hand, the "Converse Ackermann Property" reads as follows (cf. [2] , §8.12. On results on the property, cf. [12] and references therein):
Definition 17 (Converse Ackermann Property) A logic S has the Converse Ackermann Property (CAP) if (for any , , ) ( → ) → ) is unprovable in S if  does not contain an implicative formula (cf. Definition 1.3).
It is proved:
Proposition 18 Let S be a logic with the dcr. Then, S has the AP and the CAP.
Proof. (a) S has the AP. Let  → ( → ) be a wff where  does not contain implicative formulas. Then, for any variable
So,  and  →  do not share a propositional variable at the same depth. (b) S has the CAP. The proof is similar.
Remark 19
The converse of Proposition 3.3 does not hold. Consider, for example, the logic Positive Contractionless Ticket Entailment TW + . TW + has the AP and the CAP (cf. [12] ), but it does not have the drc: t6 and t7 in Section 2 are theorems of TW + .
Weak relevant matrices
Firstly the notion of a wr-matrix is defined.
Definition 20 (Weak relevant matrices -wr-matrices) Let M be a logical matrix in which   ∈  and  1      1    are elements of . And let us designate by  1 and  2 the subsets of  { 1    } and { 1    }, respectively. The sets  1 and  2 are disjoint and the members of  1 as well as those in  2 are possibly (but not necessarily) distinct of each other. Finally, the following conditions are fulfilled.
Then, it is said that M is a weak relevant matrix (wr-matrix for short).
Remark 21 In [13] wr-matrices are introduced by a simpler definition in which  1 and  2 are singletons.
Then, it is proved the following:
Theorem 22 Let M be a wr-matrix and S a logic verified by M. Then, S has the vsp.
Proof. Assume the hypothesis of Theorem 4.3 and let  →  be a wff in which  →  do not share propositional variables. Then, let   be an assignment of elements of  to the variables of  →  such that   (  ) =   for each variable   in , and   (  ) =   for each variable   in , where   ∈  1 and   ∈  2 . By conditions 1 and 2 in Definition 4.1,   () ∈  1 and   () ∈  2 . So,   ( → ) =   by condition 3 in Definition 4.1. Therefore, if  →  is a formula in which  and  do not share a propositional variable,  →  is not a theorem of S. Then, Theorem 4.3 follows by contraposition.
Example 23 Belnap's matrix M 0 is (in another notation) the following (cf. [3] ; [2] , §22. 7 7 7 7 4 4 6 5 7 4 5 6 7 5 5 7 5 7 5 5 7 7 6 6 6 7 7 6 7 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 Where:
Example 24 Meyer's Crystal lattice CL is (with a little rephrasing) the following (cf. [8] , pp. 95 ff ): Where:
Remark 25 In Example 4.4 and Example 4.5  1 and  2 could alternatively be selected as follows:
Wr-model structures and the drc
Firstly, wr-model structures and valuations in wr-models structures are defined.
Definition 26 (wr-model structures) Let M be a wr-matrix. A wr-model structure M M is the set
M  are all identical matrices to the wr-matrix M.
Definition 27 (Valuations and interpretations in a wr-model structure) A valuation  in a wr-model structure M M consists of a valuation   for all propositional variables, for each wr-matrix M  (0 ≤  ≤ ). Each   assigns one of the elements of  to each propositional variable. Then, each valuation  is extended to an interpretation  consisting of the interpretations   for all formulas, for all 0 ≤  ≤ , which are given as follows: for all propositional variables  and formulas , ,
where ( 
Then, validity is defined as follows:
Definition 28 (Validity in a wr-model structure) Let M M be a wr-model structure, Remark 29 Recall that → represents the relevant conditional and Ã the deep relevant conditional (see Section 2) . Actually, → is the conditional characterized by the →-function in the wr-matrix, and Ã the conditional defined from → by clause (vi) in the preceding definition.
Example 30 (cf. [5] ). The wr-model structure M CL is the set [5] ). Therefore, DR is a deep relevant logic: the conditional → is actually a deep relevant conditional Ã. Now, following Brady (cf. Theorem 1 in [5] ), we show that any wr-model structure M M has the drc in the sense that in all M M -valid formulas of the form  Ã ,  and  share a propositional variable at the same depth. Therefore, we will show that any wr-matrix generates a class of logics with the drc. Firstly, we have:
Lemma 31 Let M M be a wr-model structure and  Ã  a wff such that  and  do not share a propositional variable at the same depth. Then, there is some  for some interpretation  in M M such that for each subformula  of ,   () ∈  1 , and for each subformula
Proof. Assume the hypothesis of Lemma 5.6. Then, for all propositional variables  and for all natural numbers ,  does not occur at depth  in  or  does not occur at depth  in . Furthermore, suppose ( Ã ) = . Then () ≤  − 1, () ≤  − 1 and either () =  − 1 or () =  − 1. On the other hand, let  be a subformula of  or . Then,
is the highest depth of  in  (or in ). Consider now a propositional variable  at depth  in  (or in ). Then  −  − 1 is the measure of the distance of  to the highest depth  − 1 in  (or in ). Now, we set the following valuation  in M M according to which all variables in  and  are evaluated. For each propositional variable  in  Ã  put (where   and   are some fixed elements of  1 and  2 , respectively):
 does not occur at depth  in  nor in  Now, as no variable occurs at the same depth in  and , the valuation  just defined is a consistent assignment of elements of  to the variables of  Ã . Next, following Definition 5.2 and according to the particular wrmatrix on which M M is based,  is extended to an interpretation . And for this interpretation , it is proved: With the aid of Lemma 5.6, we shall prove that in formulas of the form  Ã  verified by a wr-model structure  and  share a propositional variable at the same depth.
Theorem 32 Let M M be a wr-model structure and suppose ² M M  Ã . Then,  and  share at least one propositional variable at the same depth.
Proof. Let  Ã  be a wff such that  and  do not share a propositional variable at the same depth. By Lemma 5.6 there is some  for interpretation  in M M such that for every subformula  of  and  of ,   () ∈  1 and   () ∈  2 . As  and  are subformulas of themselves,   () ∈  1 and   () ∈  2 , whence   ( → ) =   by condition 3 in Definition 4.1. So,   ( Ã )  ∈  for this interpretation  by condition vi in Definition 5.2. That is  Ã  is not valid in M M . Now, Theorem 5.7 follows by contraposition.
The section is ended by exemplifying Lemma 5.6 and Theorem 5.7.
Example 33 Consider the wr-matrix CL defined in Example 4.5. This matrix verifies the logic R and, therefore, the thesis
in Remark 2.11. Let us refer by ,  and  to t10,  and ( → ) → ,
 are the first and second occurrence of  in , respectively). Next, it is shown that the wr-model structure M CL in Example 5.5 falsifies t10. We set the following valuation ( = 3):
The assignment to  in (2) and to  in (3) above as well as the value of  and  according to vi (where 1 ≥ 3) is, for example, 1. Then,  is extended by Definition 5.2 to the corresponding interpretation . According to CL and Definition 5.2, for this interpretation , we have in succession  0 ( → ) = 3, 5 1 1 1 2 3 4 5 2 2 2 2 4 4 5 3 3 3 4 3 4 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5.
Remark 35 The following is a Hasse diagram of MD D F61 . Now, in addition to Routley and Meyer's B + (cf. [11] or [14] ), M DF61 verifies, among others, the following rules and theses:
Proposition 38 Let S be a logic axiomatized by adding to B + any selection of t18-t29. Then, S has the vsp.
Proof. By Proposition 6.4.
Then, we note the following:
Remark 39 Theses t20, t21, t22 and t24 are not provable in RM3, a strong extension of R-Mingle (see [4] on RM3). Notice, by the way, that t22 is Peirce"s law, the characteristic thesis of classical implicative logic.
Therefore, M DF6.1 characterizes a class of logics with the vsp well far off the spectrum of standard relevant logics. In the following section this matrix is used for defining deep relevant logics in which t20 and t24 are valid.
7 A wr-model structure built upon M DF6.1
According to Definition 5.1, we set: Now, it is our aim to define deep relevant logics verified by the wr-model structure M MDF6.1 . But in order to do this, we follow Brady by establishing a helpful lemma. Firstly, let us define, in addition to  , the following subsets of  in M MDF6.1 :  * = {5},  = {2 4 5} and  * = {3 4 5}. Furthermore, let us reformulate clause vi.c in Definition 5.2 as follows:
Then, it is proved:
Proof. By inspection of M DF6.1 . Now, (i), (ii) and (iii) are fairly obvious. Cases (iv)(b), (iv)(c) and (iv)(d), as well as (iv)(a) from left to right are easy. So, let us show how (iv)(a) from right to left can follow. Suppose then for any wff ,  and (0 ≤  ≤ )
Then, we clearly have:
Now it is easy to check that if any of     or  is the case, then
Then, leaning on Lemma 7.2, it is a simple (though tedious) task to prove the following:
Lemma 43
The following wff and rules of derivation are valid in the model structure M M D F61 : 
Concluding remarks
As it was pointed out in the Introduction, the drc is motivated in [5] as a necessary condition, stated in syntactic terms, for some paraconsistent logics rejecting the Contraction Law. But, not being a sufficient condition, the drc does not determine a unique deep relevant logic, similarly as the vsp does not determine a sole relevant logic. As we have seen, Brady's strategy is to restrict with the drc the class of logics with the vsp verified by Meyer's Crystal Matrix CL. And concerning this strategy, two points have to be noticed.
1. Brady chooses the logic DR (presumably an abbreviation for "Depth Relevance") as the preferred one among those definable from CL as indicated. Brady's choice is well motivated as discussed below, but it has to be remarked that, given the insufficiency of the drc, the logic DR is not "maximal" in the sense that it can be extended without it losing the drc. For example, the axioms t1, t2 and t4 of DT (see §1 above) can be added (axioms t3 and t5 are not, however, acceptable. Proof of theses facts are left to the reader).
2. The matrix CL is axiomatized by adding to relevant logic R the following axioms (cf. [8] , pp. 95, ff.):
Now, as any logic verified by CL has the vsp and, on the other hand, CL1 and CL2 are acceptable in no deep relevant logic (proof is left to the reader), it is reasonable to conclude that all deep relevant logics definable from CL are included in relevant logic R.
Brady's investigations on the topic has been pursued in [6] , [7] and [9] . In [6] , he provides a hierarchical (Routley-Meyer) semantics for relevant logics between Routley and Meyer's basic logic B and DR. The idea is to translate the different levels in the model structures discussed above into the Routley-Meyer semantics (see [6] ). And the author concludes: "We have motivated hierarchical semantics as a semantical rendition of the Depth Relevance Condition and we are now in a position to see the close relationship that exists between these two" ( [6] , p. 373). Now, it has to be remarked that, if in [5] the interest in the drc is motivated because the property is considered, a foundation for paraconsistent logics without the Contraction Law, in [7] the interest in the drc is justified by its own sake: as a fitter condition than the vsp to characterize relevant logics. It also has to be noted that the hierarchical Routley-Meyer semantics is adequate to some logics between B and DR but do not, of course, determine a unique deep relevant logic. On the other hand, in [7] and with much more detail, in [9] , a "meaning containment" semantics is defined. In this semantics, entailments are characterized by the relation of meaning containment rather than by that of meaning connection (as suggested by the vsp). This semantics is considered as a foundation of the drc "as the various depths of '→' would correspond to the various depths of containment sentence" ( [7] , p. 172).
In this context, it develops that the system DJ  is the main logic. DJ  , which is, essentially, the result of deleting A10 and R4 from DR, is said to be the logic determined by this semantics: "Thus, the entailment of DJ  can be reasonably be said to satisfy the concept of meaning containment, expressed as a content semantics" ( [7] , p.171). Consequently, it seems that it has to be concluded that DJ  is the logic adequate to the drc. Be it as it may, it is clear that, as Brady points out, DJ  has a number of convenient properties: it has a workable natural deduction system, and it is decidable, gentzenizable, metacomplete; it has the drc and a related hierarchical Routley-Meyer semantics and a simple consistent naive set theory (cf. [7] , §8).
As we have seen, the aim of this paper has been to generalize Brady's strategy by showing how to define a class of deep relevant logic from each weak relevant matrix. It has been shown that, given that there are weak relevant matrices verifying logics with the vsp not included in R, there are deep relevant logics not included in R (actually, in R-Mingle). On the other hand, it can reasonably be expected that weak relevant matrices structurally different form those treated in this paper can be found. But it has not been our purpose to propose any oh the deep relevant logics definable from M DF6.1 as an alternative to DR or DJ  . We do not know if any of these logics has properties comparable to those championed by DJ  . We do not know if any of them is decidable, gentzenizable, or has a natural deduction system worthy of the name "natural". Moreover, no logic with a7 or a9 as an axiom is representable with a Routley-Meyer affixing style semantics (see [15] ) because these axioms belong in the category "intractable principles" discussed in [15] . Therefore, no deep relevant logic with any of both axioms (and other similar axioms) can be given a hierarchical Routley-Meyer semantics of the type built up in [6] upon the standard affixing semantics. And, nevertheless, the logics defined in this paper and other related to them and defined upon a, in a sense, dual matrix to M DF6.1 are endowed with the following properties (cf. [10] ):
1. They can be given a neighborhood ternary semantics of the type treated in [8] .
And, moreover:
2. They have a "containment semantics" of the sort defined by Brady in [7] for DJ  , this showing that the latter is not the only logic adequate to this semantics.
Both characteristics make, we think, that these logics merit consideration.
